On the FT’s Alphaville blog, Matthew Klein reviews Swiss monetary policy over the last years and its effect on the real economy. He concludes that
|
SNB Holdings, 2001 - 2017(see more posts on SNB Holdings, ) - Click to enlarge |
Swiss Franc Exchange Rates, 2001 - 2017 - Click to enlarge |
Full story here Are you the author?
You Might Also Like
Weekly SNB Sight Deposits and Speculative Positions: SNB selling euros and dollars
2021-04-12
Update April 12 2021: SNB selling euros and dollars. Sight Deposits have fallen: The change is -0.5 bn. compared to last week, this means the SNB is selling euros and dollars.
Anlagepolitik der SNB laut Studie wenig nachhaltig
2021-03-31
Der Vergleich der Klimaschutzanstrengungen verschiedener Zentralbanken zeige, dass die SNB im internationalen Vergleich der G20-Staaten lediglich 24 von 130 Punkten erreiche, heisst es in einem Communiqué vom Mittwoch. Damit lande die SNB auf dem achten Rang hinter Ländern wie China, Brasilien und den europäischen Nachbarländern.
Swiss balance of payments and international investment position: 2020 and Q4 2020
2021-03-29
The current account surplus in 2020 was CHF 27 billion, down CHF 22 billion on the previous year. This decline was particularly due to the lower receipts surpluses in trade in goods and services. In the case of goods, the decline in receipts – with expenses remaining unchanged – caused the balance to decrease by CHF 11 billion to CHF 64 billion.
Geldpolitik – Prognose: SNB-Zinserhöhung frühestens in zwei Jahren
2021-03-23
Ungeachtet der jüngsten Abschwächung des Frankens dürfte die Schweizerische Nationalbank (SNB) am Donnerstag bei ihrer vierteljährlichen geldpolitischen Lagebeurteilung an ihrem Leitzins von minus 0,75 Prozent festhalten, prognostizieren alle 35 von Reuters befragte Wirtschaftsexperten. Auch die Sichteinlagen von Banken bei der Notenbank ab einem gewissen Freibetrag dürften weiterhin mit einer Gebühr von 0,75 Prozent belastet werden.
"Die SNB dürfte es nicht eilig haben, ihre geldpolitische Haltung zu straffen, während sich die Wirtschaft vom Pandemie-Schock erholt", sagte GianLuigi Mandruzzato, Ökonom bei EFG Asset Management. Die Notenbank dürfte mit Signalen für eine Verschärfung auch zuwarten, um keinen Aufwärtsdruck auf den Franken zu provozieren. Mit einem ersten Zinsschritt in der
The Swiss National Bank reports a profit of CHF 20.9 billion for 2020 (2019: CHF 48.9 billion).
2021-03-01
The Swiss National Bank reports a profit of CHF 20.9 billion for 2020 (2019: CHF 48.9 billion). The profit on foreign currency positions amounted to CHF 13.3 billion. A valuation gain of CHF 6.6 billion was recorded on gold holdings. The profit on Swiss franc positions was CHF 1.3 billion.
Swiss franc shrugs off being put on the naughty step by US
2021-01-07
For many foreign exchange traders, the US Treasury’s decision to designate Switzerland as a currency manipulator last month comes nearly six years too late and with a good dose of irony.
Krankenzusatzversicherer: FINMA sieht umfassenden Handlungsbedarf bei Leistungsabrechnungen
2020-12-19
Die Eidgenössische Finanzmarktaufsicht FINMA stellt aufgrund ihrer jüngsten Analysen fest, dass Rechnungen im Bereich der Krankenzusatzversicherung häufig intransparent sind und zum Teil unbegründet hoch oder ungerechtfertigt scheinen.
“Dirk Niepelt im swissinfo.ch-Gespräch (Interview with Dirk Niepelt),” swissinfo, 2020
2020-12-16
Swissinfo, December 14, 2020. HTML, podcast.
We talk about CBDC, the Swiss National Bank, whether CBDC would render it easier to implement helicopter drops, and how central bank profits should be distributed.
Tags: balance sheet,exchange rate,Exchange rate floor,Mercantilism,newslettersent,Notes,Real Exchange Rate,SNB Holdings,Swiss Franc,Swiss National Bank
1 comment
Stefan Wiesendanger
2017-06-06 at 14:05 (UTC 2) Link to this comment
Stefan Wiesendanger @wiesenda
Mr. Klein makes a reasonable argument that in hindsight, the SNB might have done too much. His allegation of predatory mercantilism is however far removed from the truth: the SNB is just trying to fulfil its mandate of stability. The following two points illustrate this:
1. Traditionally, the main channel for reinvesting the consistent current-account surplus abroad were the two big banks, UBS and CS. In the wake of the US and EUR crises, they were forced to de-leverage by 50%, not least by regulatory pressure emanating from the SNB. It is only fair that the capital pouring back into the country from this gigantic retrenchment should be absorbed by the SNB rather than destabilising the CHF.
2. The Swiss economy overall continues to perform well in spite of the CHF appreciation. This is however not true for all industry. The machinery sector risks to bleed out in direct competition with its peers in Southern Germany who benefit from a EUR that is far too low for them. Should Switzerland sacrifice an entire branch of core competence that took decades to centuries to build just because of a temporary currency aberration in relation to neighbouring Southern Germany, just a dozen kilometers away in many cases? I agree that this can be seen as mercantilism by those who see the current situation as permanent, but then should not Germany bear at least part of the blame?
Regarding the future, it seems clear to me that Switzerland needs to create a new channel to profitably export its traditional savings surplus. Clearly, the banking channel has been a disaster. Switzerland would be a natural breeding ground for an outward private equity industry. Such private capital outflows are what is needed to reduce the SNB balance sheet (i.e. turning private CHF claims against the SNB into private claims against foreign assets) without disturbing the currency relations.