Previous post Next post

The Incursion into Russia Will Not Solve Ukraine’s Biggest Problem

Earlier this month, Ukrainian forces crossed their northern border and entered Russian territory. The Ukrainians quickly took village after village as the Russian troops stationed in this Kursk region were sparse, often conscripted, and in some cases even unarmed.

Ukraine claimed to have captured over 400 square miles of Russian territory. Top Ukrainian officials and many of the staunchest supporters in Western media celebrated the operation as a major embarrassment for Vladamir Putin and a much-needed revival for Ukrainian morale.

But as the shock of the surprise offensive wore off and the Ukrainian gains on the ground slowed to a halt, Western foreign policy analysts were left guessing as to what exactly the strategic objective was for the incursion.

The Ukrainians officially claim it is an attempt to establish a buffer zone to minimize cross-border rocket attacks in the region, but that explanation has not been widely accepted by foreign policy experts. Some think the operation was meant to show Ukraine’s Western backers that they can still win battles in order to keep the money and weapon transfers coming. Others think the main point was to hurt Putin’s credibility with the Russian public.

For those of us calling for negotiations, this looked like it might be a last-minute attempt to scrape back some leverage over Russia before entering into talks. In the twenty-eight months since the West convinced Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to walk away from peace talks in the weeks after Russia’s 2022 invasion, Ukraine’s position in future talks has grown weaker and weaker.

First, in September of 2022, the Russians laid permanent claim to tens of thousands of square miles of Ukrainian territory that it had earlier agreed to relinquish.

There was an opportunity in November of 2022 when Ukraine launched a surprise attack and recaptured the southern city of Kherson. And, while their position was still weaker than in the spring of 2022, the victory was likely the best opportunity Ukraine would have to transition to talks, as former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley said at the time.

It did not happen. Instead, we were told a massive counteroffensive would kick off last summer to drive Russians out of much of the territory they controlled. When the time came, however, the Ukrainians struggled to break through heavy Russian minefields and, in the end, they lost more territory than they had gained. Since then, Ukraine’s position has grown even more precarious as its supply of soldiers dwindles.

Over the past months, the war has entered a somewhat stalled state as Russia hunkered down and banked on Ukraine’s faster rate of attrition—all while hawks in American media argued, absurdly, that Ukraine just needed more money and weapons to get out of a rut caused by a shortage of manpower. Ukraine had little to no leverage and was running out of time.

So it would make sense for Ukraine to try and switch things up now with an operation like what we’re seeing play out in the Kursk region. At best, the Ukrainians intend to transition to peace talks, but wanted to first grab some territory that they could use to wring concessions out of the Russians.

That would, at least, signal that the Ukrainians are open to negotiations, but it also seems unlikely to work. In order for this land grab to successfully extract concessions, the Russians must be convinced that the best way to regain their lost territory will be through talks, rather than with force. And right now, it’s clear that they are not convinced of that.

Currently, the Russians are mobilizing reserve troops to recapture the land lost in Kursk and have launched some devastating strikes on the Ukrainian supply lines supporting the incursion. They have also escalated their attacks on the main front to take advantage of Ukraine’s diversion of troops to Kursk. Although the Russians were caught off guard by the Ukrainians’ move, they are quickly regaining the momentum.

So if the objective of the Kursk incursion was intended to strengthen Ukraine’s position in future peace talks, they may once again be in a position where waiting only worsens their standing. American officials ought to reverse their terrible decision from two years ago and encourage the Ukrainians to finally push for peace talks with the Russians.

And if the intentions behind the incursion are worse—as comments by Zelensky, arguing that because Russia has not launched nuclear attacks after fighting spilled into their territory, the West can and should help the Ukrainians launch attacks deeper into Russia, suggest—that is all the more reason for Washington to regain control of its proxy and put an end to this horrific, unnecessary war.

Full story here Are you the author?
Previous post See more for 6b.) Mises.org Next post
Tags: ,

Permanent link to this article: https://snbchf.com/2024/08/okeeffe-incursion-russia-ukraine-biggest-problem/

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published.

You may use these HTML tags and attributes: <a href="" title=""> <abbr title=""> <acronym title=""> <b> <blockquote cite=""> <cite> <code> <del datetime=""> <em> <i> <q cite=""> <s> <strike> <strong>

This site uses Akismet to reduce spam. Learn how your comment data is processed.